

The Montreux Convention : Mediating Geopolitical Dynamics in the Straits

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Abstract

The Montreux Convention has a historical significance and still plays a critical role in the current geopolitical dynamics. Serving as a mediator among different parties interested in the Black Sea, it is also the guarantor for Türkiye's security by setting bounds for foreign intervention in Turkish territories. External powers such as the United States, NATO and the Russian military are limited in their access to the region. Limitations upon the Russian military have become particularly substantial during the post-Ukraine invasion period, highlighting the diplomatic importance of Montreux for world peace. However, the intensification of infrastructure projects over the recent years raises concerns about security issues for Türkiye. These projects, which run through the Black Sea and Turkish Straits, affect Turkish territory and affect European security policies, given their geopolitical proximity. Cooperation within the involved countries is essential to strengthen global diplomatic relations. Therefore, adequate policies should be implemented with regard to the framework of globalization.

Keywords: Montreux Convention, Black Sea, Bosphorus, Türkiye, straits

I. Introduction

The Turkish Strait Sea Area (TSSA) is composed of the Strait of Istanbul (Bosphorus), the Çanakkale Strait (Dardanelles), and the Sea of Marmara.¹ Given their geopolitical location, the Turkish Straits are listed as one of the world's prominent waterways, attracting attention for their economic, political and military significance.

Connecting the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea, they play an essential role as a natural waterway in commercial chains and energy transportation.

From a diplomatic aspect, the Montreux Convention signed on July 20, 1936, granted Türkiye control over the Bosphorus, Dardanelles and Marmara Sea, as well as the right to regulate the passage of warships through the straits. Therefore, it contributed to the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923, which had left unresolved aspects concerning the status of the Turkish Straits.

¹ Ünlülata, Ümit., Oğuz, Temel., Latif, Mohammed.Abdul, and Emin Özsoy. 1990. On the Physical Oceanography of the Turkish Straits. In *The Physical Oceanography of Sea Straits*, edited by Lawrence J. Pratt. NATO ASI Series. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0677-8_2

Following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the strategic importance of the Turkish straits came forward in the public discourse. In this context, the sui generis nature of the Montreux Convention serves as a guarantee for security within the Black Sea, a geopolitical phenomenon which is important both in times of peace and during times of war. Moreover, the convention is equally relevant in light of the increasing interest of the United States in the Black sea region and strategies developed by the Chinese government such as the Trans-Caspian East-West-Middle Corridor within the Belt and Road Initiative, bearing in mind potential security risks within Turkish straits.

Given Montreux's strategic significance, Türkiye's role as a mediator in Black Sea security and maritime diplomacy has been increasingly essential, necessitating new Turkish initiatives to maintain stability in the region amid shifting global power dynamics.

II. Historical Background of the Montreux Convention: Reflections on the Sevres Syndrome

Throughout history, Turkish Straits have been subject to multiple multilateral trade agreements and peace treaties, beginning with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774. Article 11 of the treaty enabled unrestricted navigation for the merchant ships of both parties² through

² Jakimovska, Viktorija. n.d. "A shift in the Russo-Ottoman balance of power in the Black Sea region: The Treaty of Kuçuk Kainardji of 1774." Oxford Public International Law. Accessed November 5, 2024. <https://opil.ouplaw.com/page/616>.

the Straits and within the seas belonging to two countries. However, in 1833, the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi temporarily granted Russia control over the Ottoman Empire and the Straits. This Russian prerogative status was reversed by the London Straits Convention of 1841³, which forbade the passage of foreign warships through Turkish Straits in peacetime⁴. The convention brought the closure of the Straits to vessels of war under the "European public law."⁵ Therefore, the regime of the Straits was granted an international status, necessitating the collective guarantee of the European Powers for a change. This international legal status was conserved within the following agreements, consecutively at the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856 and the 1878 Treaty of Berlin. "Nevertheless, the advent of the First World War brought forward new plans of invasion towards the Turkish territories. Complying with the framework of the Sykes-Picot secret agreement, Russia was promised the Turkish straits⁷, paving the way for the Allied powers' occupation of Istanbul and the Straits area. Russia's withdrawal from war due to the Bolshevik Revolution modified these projects but resulted in an increased interest

³ Yücel, Zeynep. 2023. *The Turkish Straits Treaties And Conventions*. London: Ijopoc Publication:30.

⁴ Nihat, Erim. 1953. "Sevr Andlaşması." In *Devletlerarası Hukuku ve Siyasi Tarih Metinleri*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi ed. Vol. 1. Ankara: 312-313

⁵ Tuncer, Hüner. 2009. "Osmanlı Devleti ve Büyük Güçler 1815-1878." İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları.

⁶ Maharramova Cengiz, Niğâr. 2019. "Rus Kaynaklarına Göre Lozan Konferansı'nda Boğazlar Meselesi." *Recent Period Turkish Studies*, no. 36, 179-198. <https://doi.org/10.26650/YTA2019-673232>.

⁷ Salhani, Justin. 2016. "Secret Deal That Carved Up Middle East Still Fuels Resentment." *Washington Diplomat*.

from Great Britain and France towards the Turkish territories.

In the aftermath of the First World War, given their defeat, the Ottoman Empire was compelled to sign the Mondros Armistice Agreement on October 30, 1918.⁸ Shortly after, on November 13, 1918, Istanbul and the Bosphorus region were de facto occupied by the Allied Powers, and de jure on March 16, 1920. Following the Armistice, the Treaty of Sevres,⁹ presented by the Allies at the San Remo Conference, imposed severe territorial losses, financial and military restrictions, and outlined a controlled Straits zone without Ottoman terms. Moreover, a zone of Straits was anticipated for the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, regulating the passage of the vessels without considering the will of the Ottoman representatives. Nationalists regarded the treaty of Sevres as an embodiment of the fragmented Anatolia ideal of the Allied powers and deemed it unacceptable. Conversely, after a series of back-and-forth negotiations, the commission sent by the Ottoman government ended up signing the treaty on August 10, 1920. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), the provisional and revolutionary Turkish government based in Ankara, condemned the signatories of this treaty and revoked their citizenship. Thus, motivated by freedom and national sovereignty, the Turkish War of Independence started under the leadership

⁸ Avcı, Merve. 2020. "Mondros Ateşkes Antlaşması'nın Türk Tarihi Açısından Tarihsel Önemi Üzerine Bir İnceleme." *The Journal of Academic Social Science* 8 (105): 422-435. <https://doi.org/10.29228/ASOS.43199>.

⁹ Ertan, Temuçin Faik. "Sevr ve Lozan Antlaşmaları hakkında karşılaştırmalı bir değerlendirme". *Atatürk Yolu Dergisi* 15: 58 (January 2016). https://doi.org/10.1501/Tite_0000000438.

of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. After numerous military campaigns and conflicts, the Turkish National Movement defeated the Allied Powers.

The Turkish military's victory resulted in the Government of Ankara being invited to the Lausanne Conference, where İsmet İnönü served as chief delegate. Held in two sessions, from November 20, 1922, to February 4, 1923, and from April 23 to July 24, 1923, the conference sought to renegotiate Türkiye's sovereignty and the status of the Straits.¹⁰ Avoiding foreign intervention in Turkish territory was a unanimously agreed matter that the Turkish delegates had promised not to make any concessions. Within contemporary Turkish politics, the implementation of this nationalist policy is often associated back to the non-ratified Treaty of Sevres. Although not put in place, the content of Sevres formed a national narrative against foreign intrusions, which was not only limited to the intense period of armed struggle but also shaped the Turkish diplomatic stance over the years. Contemporary Turkish analysts coined this phenomenon as the "Sevres syndrome,"¹¹ a fear of foreign territorial invasion, which influences Türkiye's diplomatic decisions to a more significant extent. Following Türkiye's recognition as an independent and sovereign state at the

¹⁰ Ahmad, Feroz. 2010. "Military and Politics in Turkey." In *Turkey's Engagement with Modernity: Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Celia Kerslake, Kerem Öktem, and Philip Robins. N.p.: Palgrave Macmillan UK. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230277397>: 481.

¹¹ Jung, Dietrich. 2001. "The Sèvres Syndrome: Turkish Foreign Policy and Its Historical Legacies." In *Oil and Water: Co-Operative Security in the Persian Gulf*, edited by Bjørn Møller. London: I.B. Tauris Publishers.

Lausanne Conference, the impact of the national narrative was demonstrated. However, the Government of Ankara wasn't satisfied with the treatment of one of the most prominent questions: the status of the Turkish Straits. Throughout the conference, parties had claimed different requests. The Allied Powers were in favor of the demilitarization of the Turkish straits, with a provision of freedom of passage for the vessels. On the other hand, İsmet İnönü demonstrated a firm will toward the status of the Straits, highlighting the importance of maintaining security within the area. Upon the terms of the Lausanne Treaty, the straits remained under the patronage of the International Straits Commission, which was to be headed by a Turkish national. Article 23¹² of the treaty further determined the principle of freedom of transit and of navigation by sea and by air, in time of peace as in time of war, allowing unrestricted civilian and military traffic through the straits. That being said, the establishment of the 1936 Montreux convention is a following sequence to the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty in which the term "Turkish Strait"¹³ was used for the first time.

The International Straits Commission was regarded as a threat to Türkiye's full independence and international

security.¹⁴ Thereafter, TBMM took over Turkish public diplomacy and paved the way for the signature of the Montreux Convention on July 20, 1936.

With the 1936 Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, all rights of the International Commission were transferred to Turkey, and the Straits were remilitarized with the Turkish army. Consequently, traffic provisions to belligerent countries were abolished, restricting warships' passage.

The ratification of Montreux was seen as a diplomatic victory for the Turkish government. This can be observed in President Atatürk's opening speech for the 3rd Legislative Year of the 5th Term of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.¹⁵ Atatürk expressed his satisfaction with the new regime accorded to the Straits and highlighted the importance of this convention within the recognition of Türkiye's rights. He therefore drew attention to Montreux's universal contribution to the maintenance of world peace by regulating public affairs from an international dimension. These elements affirmed the absolute sovereignty of Türkiye over its straits and gave the country a lever of power within the balancing powers during peacetime and war.

III. Current Geopolitical Circumstances and Strategic Importance

¹² "Lausanne Peace Treaty." n.d. Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed November 5, 2024. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/lausanne-peace-treaty-part-i_-political-clauses.en.mfa.

¹³ Usluer, Hasan B., Güler B. Alkan, and Osman Turan. 2002. "A Ship Maneuvers could be predicted in the Turkish Straits by Marine Science Effects?" *International Journal of Environment and Geoinformatics (IJEGEO)* 9 (4): 95-101. <https://doi.org/10.30897/ijegeo.1124160>.

¹⁴ Köylü, Murat. 2024. "Turkish Public Diplomacy in the Minutes of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (1931-1938)." *Anadolu University Journal of Social Sciences* 24 (3): 1359-1376. <https://doi.org/10.18037/ausbd.1478926>.

¹⁵ Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Zabıt Ceridesi, 5th session, 3rd legislative year, vol. 13, 1st assembly, November 1, 1936, 6.

Türkiye's role amid international power dynamics has become increasingly prominent, especially since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Starting from February 24, 2022, the Russian military operation in Ukraine raised concerns over Black Sea security.

Connected to the Mediterranean through the Turkish Straits, the Black Sea constitutes a semi-enclosed sea¹⁶ bordered by Türkiye, Georgia, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria.¹⁷ According to UNCLOS article 123,¹⁸ Black Sea littoral states are called to cooperate for a regional organization. However, instability within the area is prominent, as it's susceptible to military attacks and strategies. Given the multilateral nature of the geopolitical dynamics, the security of states comes forward. The Montreux Convention has, therefore, become pivotal to sustain the security in the Black Sea, particularly during crises, wars, and third-party invasions.

All along the Second World War, Türkiye restricted the passage of warships from belligerent states, thus mediating between the Axis powers and the Soviet Union. A likewise attitude persisted during the Cold War, as non-littoral NATO exercise was forbidden in the Black Sea. During the post-Soviet era, the long-standing Russian dominance

decreased drastically, opening opportunities for other countries, mainly NATO, to increase their presence in the region. Russia perceived these advancements as a threat and ended up annexing Crimea in 2014 to consolidate its power.¹⁹ The dominance-seeking strategies of Russia reached their peak with the declaration of war of Ukraine in 2022. Following the recognition of the separatist republics Donetsk and Luhansk in east Ukraine as independent states, the Russian troops' invasion on Ukraine surpassed the Donbas region. The Western countries evaluated this attack as a threat to human rights and European stability. Differentiating itself from the West, Türkiye adapted a neutral stance and gave its support to Ukraine whilst maintaining relations with Russia.

Türkiye's stance on the Black Sea conflict can be understood through its responsibility to safeguard regional security. The Montreux Convention regarding the regime of the straits constitutes a potential regulator of warship traffic for the conflict area, based on their duration of deployment (21 days) and tonnage. On February 24, the day Russia began its invasion of Ukraine, the Ukrainian government requested Turkish straits to be closed to the Russian warships. However, Ankara responded concerning the articles of the Montreux Convention, pointing out that Russian warships would be free to transit. This decision was reversed on February 27, as Türkiye qualified the Russian invasion on Ukraine as a state of war, thereby

¹⁶ United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 122, December 10, 1982, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.

¹⁷ Baldıran, Selen, Dinçer Bayer, and Hüseyin Gençer. 2023. "The Importance of the 1936 Montreux Convention for the Black Sea Security: A Close Look into Russia-NATO Controversy on the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict in 2022." *ISIJ* 51:11-23. <https://doi.org/10.11610/isij.5101>.

¹⁸ United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 123.

¹⁹ Sarıççek, Elif, and Tolga Öztürk. n.d. "The Annexation of Crimea and Türkiye's Balancing Role in the Russia-Ukraine War." *Manisa Celal Bayar University Journal of Social Sciences* 22 (2): 238-255. <https://doi.org/10.18026/cbayarsos.1425589>.

closing its straits to the Russian warships. Therefore, Türkiye invoked Article 19 and Article 18 of the Montreux Convention to avoid any potential naval confrontation between the parties.

Russian naval strategy dynamics were coeval with the amplified presence of the United States in the region. Backed up by NATO's strategic interest to counter the Russian involvement, the US took aim at securing the shipping routes. These attempts can be traced back to 2006, when the US decided to reflect on expanding NATO's maritime security operation in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.²⁰ The greater motive of this operation was to establish a maritime structure in Black Sea to monitor suspect ships, to enhance security. Nonetheless, Türkiye held the presence of non-littoral NATO and US as a potential violation of the Montreux Convention. The proposal of the US was seen as bypassing the principle of military non-involvement of the third parties within the region. In 2008, during the Georgian War, the US requested permission to deploy two military hospital ships. Still, the Turkish government overturned this request, given that the size of the ships exceeded the limit. Broadly, the US interest in the Black Sea can be explained by limiting the Russian strength in the region, with energy security playing a significant role in these strategic

calculations.²¹ These strategies have been translated into specific projects based on the supply of Caspian oil to Europe and the West, thus maximizing inter-regional trade and enhancing country integration.

Following similar goals, Chinese infrastructure initiatives were pulled towards the Turkish straits, due to the potential promises they could offer from economic and political aspects. Serving as a bridge between the European and the Asian continent, the straits were seen to be key maritime chokepoints. For Chinese stakeholders, this was an important step to further implement a Trans-Caspian strategy, driving forward China's role within the international field. Among the projects of Chinese foreign policy, the Trans-Caspian East-West-Middle Corridor (TITR) as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),²² has become prominent for global economic governance and aims to revive ancient economic and civilisational ties across Asia, Africa, and Europe.²³ The initiative appears to be a geopolitically motivated economic strategy, positioning China within a more proactive approach to the international financial markets.

²⁰ Larrabee, F. S. 2009. "The United States and security in the Black Sea region." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 9, no. 3 (September): 301–315. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683850902934309>.

²¹ Mitchell, Lincoln A. 2008. "More than location: crafting a US policy for the Black Sea region." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 8, no. 2 (June): 129–140. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683850802117617>.

²² Duggan, Niall, Jörn-Carsten Gottwald, and Sebastian Bersick. 2024. "Still a Work in Progress: The Ongoing Evolution of the Role Conception Underlying China's Belt and Road Initiative." *Area Development and Policy* 9 (3): 385–406. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23792949.2024.2311891>.

²³ Pauls, Robert, and Jörn-Carsten Gottwald. 2018. "Origins and dimensions of the belt and road initiative: Experimental patchwork or grand strategy?" In *China's Global Political Economy: Managerial Perspectives*, edited by Robert Taylor and Jacques Jaussaud, 31-54. Routledge ed. N.p.: Taylor & Francis. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315102566-3>.

As a branch of this Chinese policy strategy, the TITR was developed as a transport route that would provide energy transfer by bridging Asia to Europe through the Caspian Sea.²⁴ The route is thought to go through different countries, starting “from Southeast Asia and China, through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia to European countries”²⁵. Given its wide route, the TITR aimed at linking the Chinese economy to other economies in Central Asia, the Caucasus, Türkiye, and Eastern Europe. Therefore, regional integration was sought to be implemented with increased economic growth in return. Among these countries, Türkiye stands out with its LPI rank, accounting for the country’s logistics performance²⁶ which scored high in different categories of trade dimensions. This potential for trade volume attracts rail projects to be carried out through Turkish territories.

The importance of the TITR has further intensified in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Western bloc had imposed numerous packages of sanctions against the country, hindering their overall gains from transport chains. The underlying motive of these projects to put China as a leader within trade chains could result in further outshining of Russia, which was already the case

with the Western boycott. Thus, within the current state of affairs, this logistics route promises many opportunities.

It should be noted that the project’s envisaged framework indicates that Türkiye would be a key actor within these infrastructure operations. Therefore, the Montreux Convention’s role as a mediator appears to be increasingly important, both for providing regional security between conflicting parties and for contributing to the growth of trade volume under monitored conditions.

IV. Domestic Politics

Within Turkish politics, the status of Turkish straits came forward with the advent of the Canal Istanbul Project. Constituting a mega-scale urban intervention²⁷ for the natural landscape of the straits, the project received a significant public backlash.

The first mention of the Canal Istanbul project can be traced back to 2011 by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who was the prime minister of Türkiye at the time. The project aimed to construct a new canal that would link the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara. It was foreseen that this new canal would run parallel to Bosphorus, the natural strait of Istanbul. However, the urban project’s conduct was based on destroying the existing environmental landscape to replace it with an artificial sea-level waterway. The project’s main purpose was to ease the shipping traffic on the Bosphorus Strait by creating an alternative for maritime shipping within the city. Moreover, it was envisioned as a

²⁴ Palu, Riina, and Olli-Pekka Hilmola. 2023. “Future Potential of Trans-Caspian Corridor: Review” *Logistics* 7, no. 3: 39. <https://doi.org/10.3390/logistics7030039>

²⁵ “ROUTE.” 2024. TITR - Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. <https://middlecorridor.com/en/>.

²⁶ “Logistics Performance Index (LPI).” 2023. International Scorecard Page. <https://lpi.worldbank.org/international/scorecard/radar/C/TUR/2023>.

²⁷ Baba, Ece C. 2020. “The risks of mega urban projects creating a dystopia: Canal Istanbul.” *City and Environment Interactions* 6 (April). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cacint.2020.100039>.

potential catalyst to reverse the downturn in the Turkish economy.

However, following the very first statements made about the project, opposing arguments for the construction initiatives emerged. Political and environmental debates reached their peak with Erdogan's announcement in 2021 that the Montreux Convention wouldn't apply to Canal Istanbul.²⁸ This declaration was perceived as a danger to the Montreux Convention, as it would pave the way for openings or negotiations.²⁹ A potential reconsideration of the terms of the convention under the renovated landscape of the straits could result in an imbalance between global powers. Notably the US, NATO, and Russia could assert a firmer grip within the region, interpreting the gaps in the convention for their own benefit.

In the aftermath of the legal objections filed about the project, the zoning plans which were originally announced within the project were annulled by the Istanbul 11th Administrative Court on February 14, 2024. From an international perspective, the implementation of the Canal Istanbul Project would have constituted more of a potential threat than an opportunity for the global powers.

²⁸ Uras, Umut. 2021. "Turkey's Canal Istanbul dispute explained | Explainer News." Al Jazeera. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/5/turkey-what-you-need-to-know-on-canal-istanbul-montreux-dispute>.

²⁹ Bouvier, Emile. 2021. "La Convention de Montreux : quel est cet accord historique que le futur Canal d'Istanbul risque de compromettre (2/2) ? Contenu de l'accord et enjeux actuels." Les clés du Moyen-Orient. <https://www.lesclesdumoyenorient.com/La-Convention-de-Montreux-quel-est-cet-accord-historique-que-le-futur-Canal-d-3373.html>.

V. Solutions and Policy Recommendations

In current affairs, the Turkish Straits are under the spotlight of manifold global powers, which increases the significance of Türkiye's role within these dynamics. The Turkish government possesses a non-negligible responsibility to hold the lever of power granted by the straits. In this regard, progressive policies should be envisaged to strengthen Turkish regional diplomacy.

First of all, the Turkish government should take an initiative for diplomatic forums to tackle issues relating to the security of the Black Sea. Given the increasing interest of external powers, regional security should be discussed thoroughly to sustain peace within the region. Operating on a multilateral basis, these forums encourage notably the participation of the parties of the Montreux Convention. It is highly important to prioritize the convention's signatories for matters related to the Black Sea to enhance their reliance on the convention terms.

Moreover, from a more theoretical framework, the articles of the Montreux Convention should be peer-reviewed to detect any potential gaps that may result from technological developments in naval warfare. This issue has become significant with the increasing use of maritime equipment other than vessels such as drone warfares. The use of drones has been a common practice by Ukraine towards the Russian naval presence in the Black Sea.³⁰ Although the Ukrainian drone warfare is aimed at

³⁰ Kirichenko, David. 2024. "Sea Drones Helping Ukraine Win the Battle of the Black Sea." Geopolitical Monitor. <https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/sea-drones-helping-ukraine-win-the-battle-of-the-black-sea/>.

defense, this novel military use necessitates a reconsideration for cyber threats that new technologies may impose. Other than that, traditional maritime shipping is no longer the case within the global dynamics and that new infrastructure projects could further alter them. The establishment of advanced monitoring systems used to track the state of the environment in real-time may be distorted to gather more private information relating to the naval force of the parties involved. International data collection by these systems could therefore lose their authenticity, resulting in problems for marine security and conflicts of interests. This aspect of globalization provides openings for increased involvement from international bodies like the EU or UN to foster the multilateral nature of infrastructure projects. Providing a more objective stance on delicate matters would mitigate the tensions between global powers. That's why a supranational institution specializing in maritime conflicts could provide a practical means of involvement that aligns with the framework of international law.

VI. Conclusion

The strategic importance of the Montreux Convention is crucial amid global geopolitical dynamics. Both in terms of mediating the interests of different parties and implementing a regional security within Black Sea, Türkiye is endowed with a lever of power that puts forward the country diplomatically. On that matter, the changing geopolitical circumstances pose various challenges to sustain a peaceful international environment. Recently, the Russian war on Ukraine and its naval strategy in Black Sea,

as well as the Chinese infrastructure initiatives on Turkish straits and increasing US interest for maritime policy implementation paved the way for reconsiderations upon the regional security of Black Sea. These international developments were combined with the advent of the Canal Istanbul Project within domestic politics, which was highly contested as it was seen to be a violation of Montreux. Dynamics between global powers are dynamic, and therefore, implementation of adequate progressive policies is crucial. Prioritizing the organization of diplomatic conferences and forums would provide a multilateral domain for parties to come together and negotiate formally upon matters. Furthermore, the technological advancements of our century should be considered in those negotiations to adopt effective strategies for regional security. Beyond Türkiye's role, the responsibility also extends to global powers. Establishing a supranational maritime institution or encouraging greater NATO engagement could help ease the Russian tension in the Black Sea, provided these actions align with the Montreux Convention. Ultimately, cooperation between nations is essential for the greater aim of regional security, embodying the spirit of solidarity that globalization fosters towards shared goals.

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