

Optimizing Post-Conflict Recovery and Stability: What are the factors that lead to the Economic Success of Regimes Post Long-Term Cross-National Conflicts in the 21st Century?

Nathan Fernandez

IE School of Economics, Politics & Global Affairs, IE University, Segovia, Spain
E-mail: nfernandez.ieu2023@student.ie.edu

Published 27th of January 2025

Abstract

Cross-national conflicts that occur within a single nation through occupation-style operations often lead to a complicated web of concerns in terms of optimizing future recovery for the region in humanitarian and economic terms. The case of the American invasion of Iraq shows that the initiator of the conflict must begin crafting a recovery plan well in advance with regard to short and long-run goals. In the short run, aid must be adequately supplied whilst collaborating with expert humanitarian bodies in the field with pre-existing mechanisms to deliver said relief. From a more long-run view, knowledge of the conflict nation's key resources and socioeconomic conditions (often with an added historical dimension) is necessary to allow optimal resource management and state-building efforts. Without securing key resources, national borders and competent human resources in key institutions, instability is very likely to persist in the region. This could lead to draining conflict for both the high-income initiator and the relatively weaker occupied state, further weakened by conflict.

Keywords: Post-conflict Reconstruction, Peacebuilding, Foreign Aid, Governance

I. Introduction

Wars place a significant strain on human livelihoods, infrastructure and institutions. There have been at least 22 major conflicts that have at least partly or completely transpired during the 21st century¹. Although many of these conflicts were civil wars, a sizable portion includes cross-country conflict, which has, up until now, had a lasting effect on all parties involved – most significantly on the nation that was the main battleground during the conflict. Once a conflict culminates, these impacts are amplified, as fragile post-war states must find their footing quickly. Part of this

¹ “21st Century Conflicts | Military History Books | Helion & Company,” accessed November 7, 2024, <https://www.helion.co.uk/periods/21st-century.php>.

responsibility may fall on the more domineering world power involved, especially in the case of developed nations' military operations in developing countries. The hurried US departure from Afghanistan most recently left a power vacuum that allowed the oppressive by Western democratic standards Taliban regime to emerge². Additionally, much criticism can be attributed to France's role in Central Africa, which has led to several undemocratic regimes budding as French influence in the region diminishes³

It is important to study successful cases of post-war economic and political planning to replicate elements of these policies that hold constant in different regions and contexts. Although particular cases may vary due to unique country-specific conditions and the nature of the conflict, updated studies on post-war conflict will continue to help interpolate future post-war crisis management. The relevance of this topic is even more urgent when one considers the ongoing conflicts like the Israel-Palestine war, which began on October 7th, 2023 and has now seen Iran and Lebanon enter the fray, threatening to destabilize the whole region. The Russia-Ukraine conflict, which began in February of 2022, is another key example of a conflict that interacts on a deeper level with region-wide security but with its unique underlying causes. These issues will require some form of policy guidance in the short to medium run. Research into the topic that this paper hopes to tackle will add some insight into best practices and how the timing of these best practices is important to their implementation.

A thorough study of cross-border conflicts may also yield potential deviations from measures associated with internal conflicts, given possibly large inequalities between the conflict participants, complications with withdrawal and matters of international diplomacy that may dictate the conflict's direction. More focus on relationships with neighbouring states is a strong area of discussion here that debates over civil wars may not address as strongly, with this study having a lot stronger implications for region-wide prosperity.

2. Literature Review

The issue of post-conflict reconstruction has been widely studied by international organizations and political theorists with frequent amendments, given the evolving nature of the topic across periods and regions.

A bulk of the studies in this field center around civil wars, which, although separate from our topic of cross-country conflicts, still draws some parallels to the general ideas of economic reconstruction and peacebuilding that both situations are trying to address. The work of David et al. in an IMF working paper details the factors that cause cross-country differentials in the growth performance of post-conflict economies⁴. Their quantitative study of 30 Sub-Saharan African

² Saira Akram and Muqarrab Akbar, "US Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Emerging Challenges and Future Prospects," *Global Foreign Policies Review* VI, no. I (March 30, 2023): 97–111, [https://doi.org/10.31703/gfpr.2023\(VI-I\).09](https://doi.org/10.31703/gfpr.2023(VI-I).09).

³ Panira Ali, "FRENCH COLONIALISM TO NEO-COLONIALISM IN MALI: : AN ANALYTICAL STUDY," *Journal of European Studies (JES)* 34, no. 2 (July 2, 2018): 112–29.

⁴ Antonio C David, Fabiano Rodrigues Bastos, and Marshall Mills, "Post-Conflict Recovery: Institutions, Aid, or Luck?," June 2011.

countries indicates that terms of trade have the strongest impact on economic performance amongst recovering countries, which may indicate that trade with neighbours and other external states may in fact be more helpful than aid for recovery purposes when economic growth is the measure under consideration. Terms of trade are followed by institutional quality and exogenous shocks in the study, with exogenous shocks being more impactful when there is a high degree of social division or very weak institutions.

David et al. also highlight a point that Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler echo - the period right after the termination of conflict produces supra-normal growth⁵. In David et al, this is explained using the Solow growth model and how the destruction of capital stock during conflict leads to the catch-up effect, which produces a rapid growth rate to get back to the steady state, whilst Total Factor Productivity also increases simultaneously. However, this “supranatural” growth window is contingent on several institutional factors being present in the state in question. State governments must be competent in their core functions in order to take adaptive advantage of supranatural growth windows and make the most out of any foreign aid they receive, as per Ndikumana⁶. This same paper delves into the concept of “state-building” to best put into motion sustained growth and tackle government failure that hampers the effectiveness of aid.

One such core function, as per Ndikumana, is “revenue mobilization”, i.e. the ability of the state to generate revenues from domestic resources⁷. This ties into a significant concept often overlooked during the planning of post-conflict transitions, but one that Brown emphasizes heavily - the importance of natural resources. Brown introduces the concept of “lootable” natural resources that open the door to all kinds of illicit activities way past the termination of conflict. These activities may allow combatants to continue acting as “spoilers” or create illegal trade links that could spread across borders. Unjustly exploiting these resources could halt reconstruction and further weaken any institutions left behind⁸. As per Brown, the United Nations has begun using language that acknowledges the role of natural resources in its policy documentation. However, a lack of complementary measures to prosecute or punish offenders adequately could allow resource exploitation to continue. The timber industry in Cambodia and diamonds in Angola are two such examples of unchecked natural resource exploitation that creates a shadow economy, which undermines the institutional stability post-war states require for recovery⁹.

Lastly, the goals of post-conflict economies are a key talking point that the literature covers in different ways. Most of the papers mentioned above consider economic growth as an indicator of success for post-conflict states in their

⁵ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies,” *European Economic Review* 48, no. 5 (October 1, 2004): 1125–45, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2003.11.005>.

⁶ Léonce Ndikumana, “The Role of Foreign Aid in Post-Conflict Countries,” in *Building Sustainable Peace*, ed. Arnim Langer and Graham K. Brown (Oxford University Press, 2016), 1–3, <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198757276.003.0009>.

⁷ Ndikumana, 11–13.

⁸ Kaysie Brown, “War Economies and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Identifying a Weak Link,” 1–10, accessed November 7, 2024, <https://journals-sagepub-com.ie.idm.oclc.org/doi/epdf/10.1080/15423166.2006.260470878529>.

⁹ Brown, 11–13.

respective studies. However, additional factors like preventing the re-occurrence of conflict and state-building are some other objectives that nations may apply instead, especially in the short run immediately after the termination of conflict. There are some links between all three of the aforementioned factors. Still, as per Ndikumana, nations could look to pursue aims like state-building early on to ensure political stability without the possibility of conflict. This then leads to growth acceleration in the future, allowing aims to work adjacently. However, distinctive policies at different times reflect the process of prioritizing objectives during post-conflict reconstruction¹⁰.

3. Methodology

This paper will follow a descriptive approach that analyzes the factors surrounding post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq following the withdrawal of American forces in 2011, following their initial entry in 2003. This case has been chosen, as it highlights a long-term conflict in the 21st century, whose post-war reconstruction efforts have been allowed to unfold in a way that has been closely documented. Additionally, the difference in wealth between the two parties and the heavy investment of the United States in efforts to stabilize the Iraqi state captures the essence of this paper's research question. Lastly, given the continued instability in the Middle Eastern region, the policy implications drawn from this case have the potential for near-term application.

Some of the key features of this case study are summarized below:

Criteria	Expected Value
Duration of Conflict	March 2003 to December 2011
Long-Term Effects of Conflict	Regime change
Time Period	21st Century
GDP per Capita Difference between Combatants in 2002	USD 36 743.44 (In 2024 US Dollars)

Table 1. Key Features
Source: Own elaboration

This case will be explored using a similar set of key concepts. Based on the literature review conducted, this would include: foreign aid, state of natural resources, internal policy interventions and external policy interventions from actors like opposing parties or international organizations like the United Nations. These concepts form an outline for dealing with a case study. Still, country-specific conditions may require looking at relevant factors that do not apply to other conflicts or further surveying nuances within the aforementioned key concepts. Summary statistics and graphical data will be paired with the descriptive analysis to give a numerical representation of recovery efforts. Then, a section will be

¹⁰ Ndikumana, "The Role of Foreign Aid in Post-Conflict Countries," 9–11.

dedicated to generalizing the policy implications of the case and discussing different recovery tools along with whether the region or any other factor may have caused varied efficacy of tool performance.

4. Case Study: Second Gulf War

Second Gulf War - (March 2003 - December 2011) - Major Participants: Iraq, United States of America, United Kingdom, Australia

As a part of the United States of America's 'War on Terror' following the 9/11 attacks, US President George W. Bush initiated 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' in March 2003 under the assumptions that Iraq possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and that the state had ties to terrorist group Al-Qaeda. Following the toppling of Saddam Hussein's government, the American government spent a long period of time attempting to stabilize the Iraqi state, following which it began to transition control to Iraqi forces and withdraw between 2009 and 2011. The last American forces withdrew in December 2011, marking a controversial end to direct American involvement in Iraq.

The main basis for this case study is the US's pre-war reconstruction plan and the efforts of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) led by American administrator Paul Bremer from May 2003 to June 2004. Given that the US began detailed post-war reconstruction planning in September of 2002, months before hostilities began, it is clear that they were aware of the significant challenges they would have to overcome to achieve their aim of consolidating a stable Iraqi state following the removal of Saddam Hussein¹¹.

4.1 Short-Term Relief & Security

Several US departments, namely the National Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Defense, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), collaborated to implement the early stages of American involvement in Iraq. A key part of this process was collaboration with NGOs and humanitarian bodies like the United Nations (UN) that worked to provide relief to distressed Iraqi regions, partly helped by existing platforms like 'Oil for Food' established by the UN in 1995 and other UNICEF and UNDP agencies that were already operating in Iraq¹². A key part of administering this aid was placed in the hands of the Department of Defense training as reconstruction was attempted to be integrated into military strategy with programs like the training of a 60-man Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) that played a key role in managing civil-military relations¹³.

¹¹ Roger Mac Ginty, "The Pre-War Reconstruction of Post-War Iraq," *Third World Quarterly* 24, no. 4 (August 2003): 605, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0143659032000105777>.

¹² Tom Coipuram, "Iraq: United Nations and Humanitarian Aid Organizations," March 1, 2003.

¹³ "Briefing on Humanitarian Reconstruction Issues," accessed December 19, 2024, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030224-11.html>.

By 2003, Congress had already approved \$2.3 billion in funds through the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), which aimed to provide immediate relief in regards to essentials like medicines, sustenance and water. The IIRF projects incorporated some of the aforementioned elements of recovery being built into the military, as it also contributed to civilian-military programs like the Sadr city sewage project, one of multiple projects meant to equip post-conflict areas with basic infrastructure along with the fiscal stimulus of employment¹⁴. This dimension, however, was overshadowed by the corruption of institutions set up to deliver it, the misallocation of sources and the lack of security in the region, indicating it was only a short-term measure that was superseded by other long-run factors. Although the immediate positive impacts of foreign aid cannot be underplayed, the literature shows that people need complex economic systems to thrive on a societal level and without the necessary foundations in terms of resource management and state-building, any humanitarian relief will be restricted to being a temporary source of solace.

Additionally, it is hard to discuss this aspect of recovery since a part of the American justification for entry into Iraq was to replace Saddam Hussein's allegedly oppressive regime that had reportedly committed genocide against the Kurds and several other political dissidents¹⁵. Given that, this goal was achieved but at the cost of indefinite violence in the region, it is hard to gauge the success of humanitarian goals fully due to their normative nature.

4.2 Resource Management

Oil is Iraq's key natural resource in terms of domestic use and export revenue generated. In this case, oil serves as a lootable resource that could be easily manipulated to serve the private interests of spoilers instead of the state's betterment. The first and biggest issue in regard to resource management for the US was securing the safety of oil reserves, given the constant attacks on oil sites by rebel parties. In 2004, the northern pipeline was blown up around 37 times, whilst the southern pipelines faced around 10 attacks that year¹⁶. In fact, between 2003 and 2007, there were almost 400 attacks on Iraqi oil infrastructure, indicating the US did not offer adequate protection to these key resource centres with almost \$1.4 billion in damages due to combat and looting in the early stages of the invasion¹⁷.

Aside from the safety aspect of oil management, the Energy Infrastructure Planning Group (EIPG) was established under the Department of Defense to carry out institutional reform in order to restore and maintain Iraqi oil production capabilities. With US support and the presence of capable human capital in the Iraqi oil industry, Iraqi oil production

¹⁴ Bureau of Public Affairs Department Of State. The Office of Electronic Information, "Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Achievements Through the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund" (Department Of State. The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs., February 8, 2006), <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/60857.htm>.

¹⁵ Thomas Cushman, *A Matter of Principle: Humanitarian Arguments for War in Iraq* (Univ of California Press, 2005), 78.

¹⁶ Dag Harald Claes, "The United States and Iraq: Making Sense of the Oil Factor," *Middle East Policy* 12, no. 4 (2005): 52, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2005.00223.x>.

¹⁷ Hideki Matsunaga, *The Reconstruction of Iraq after 2003: Learning from Its Successes and Failures* (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2019), 63–64, <https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-1390-0>.

soon recovered in terms of volumes whilst still facing internal challenges. The CPA lost faith amongst Iraqi oil officials due to its unpopular decision-making, like the implementation of a “dysfunctional payroll system” and the appointment of an inexperienced minister in September 2003¹⁸. This stopped the CPA from instilling deep seeded change and led to the oil industry, like many others, becoming a field afflicted by corruption. The large oil revenues and capital inflows, in conjunction with poor state-building on the justice front, allowed many officials to engage in corruption with little to no fear of the consequences. The CPA’s various anti-corruption initiatives- The Commission of Integrity (COI) and Offices of inspectors general in 2004, followed by the Joint Anti-Corruption Council in 2007- were all extremely vulnerable to political interference and the lack of autonomy for COI and Offices of inspectors general to conduct independent investigations^{19 20}.

CPA governance did not put into place adequate anti-corruption measures and despite its successes in allowing lucrative private players to enter the Iraqi oil market when they transferred control to the new Iraqi government, the existence of corruption was extremely discouraging for private investment in Iraqi businesses as a whole. In fact, a July 2010 audit found USD 8.7 billion of Development Fund of Iraq (DFI) funds unaccounted for, showing that the problem was not close to being solved even a year before American withdrawal²¹.

4.3 State-Building

Firstly, a key part of the CPA’s was the de-Baathification of Iraq - essentially removing the influence of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath party following his overthrow in April 2003. A key criticism of this initiative was the rise in sectarian and ethnic divisions that this campaign created and the “severe human resource constraints” that rendered several key institutions ineffective²². A key example of this is how Interim Governing Council members were elected with “*ethno-sectarian quotas*” that fueled candidates to take strong sectarian stances to appeal to their electorate of focus²³. This not only amplified the existing divisions within Iraqi society but also cemented them in an institutional setting, creating long-term ripple effects.

Part of this ethno-sectarian framework has spread outside of Iraq to its neighbours, given the existence of similar groups in other Middle Eastern nations. Shi’ia groups have found themselves turning to Iran, Kurds have bolstered ties

¹⁸ Matsunaga, 65.

¹⁹ Matsunaga, 86–87.

²⁰ Ali Abbas Kareem, Safa Mahdi Raji, and Basim Abdullah Kadhim, “THE WEAKNESS OF THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE INTEGRITY COMMISSION IN REDUCING THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL CORRUPTION IN IRAQ AN ANALYTICAL STUDY FOR THE PERIOD OF 2005-2020 (RESEARCH SERIES)” 20, no. 6 (2021): 13–18.

²¹ “U.S. Can’t Account for \$8.7 Billion of Iraq’s Money: Audit,” *Reuters*, July 27, 2010, sec. World, <https://www.reuters.com/article/world/us-cant-account-for-87-billion-of-iraqs-money-audit-idUSTRE66Q556/>.

²² Sansom Aran Milton, “THE NEGLECTED PILLAR OF RECOVERY: A STUDY OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN POST--WAR IRAQ AND LIBYA,” n.d., 194.

²³ Milton, 215–16.

with Turkiye, and Sunnis have found support in Arab nations like Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jordan. This has allowed the emergence of several militant groups and non-state actors, militias and non-state actors such as ISIS, Ansar al-Sunna, the Mahdi Army and others that destabilize internal politics and also lead to increased polarization in the Middle Eastern region as a whole, as seen through events like the Syrian crisis in 2011, which spilt over into Iraqi political discourse given parts of the Sunni populous's deep connection with the Syrian state²⁴.

Lastly, this division also reflected in key areas of development such as higher education, wherein the CPA was tasked with rebuilding a system where nearly 84% of Higher Education Institutions were destroyed with projected initial Emergency reconstruction costs of \$100 million for tertiary education in 2004, as per the Ministry of Higher Education in Iraq and the UN/World Bank Joint Needs Assessment with an estimated \$1.2 billion spend to fully restore the Iraqi higher education system²⁵. American funding for reconstruction was criticised as it failed to allocate funds on the basis of university-specific needs and failed to invest adequately in physical infrastructure as per university representatives that were interviewed²⁶. A bigger issue was that the US government was using non-competitive contracts to carry out reconstruction, which led to several months of delays due to bureaucratic inefficiency²⁷. In regards to political undercurrents that went into educational reform, the aforementioned de-Baathification process led to several human resource constraints as many qualified academics were dismissed from their positions due to their affiliation with the Ba'ath party. Given that many of these educators held party membership on a nominal basis, the decision to place such a large crunch on the labour force of a restarting economy in education and other fields like the justice system led to the absence of a large proportion of a competent workforce that was left with negative sentiments towards the American project.

5. Generalizing Results

It is clear from the Iraqi case that the involvement of humanitarian organizations in the reconstruction efforts starting from a pre-war position is necessary. The US government did well in beginning to plan reconstruction efforts pre-war in conjunction with integrating reconstruction into military objectives; however, poor liaison with NGOs can seriously stifle positive shifts. It is important for the nation in a position to plan reconstruction to collaborate with specialised

²⁴ "Rebuilding the Iraqi State: The Regional Dimension of Ethno-Sectarian Conflict (2003-2016) - ProQuest," 1–8, accessed December 19, 2024,

<https://www.proquest.com/docview/2189020106/53785F8FAC8041F5PQ/3?accountid=27285&sourcetype=Dissertations%20&%20Theses>.

²⁵ "UN/World Bank Iraq Joint Needs Assessment: Education Sector," 12–16, accessed December 19, 2024,

<https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/898741468262742934/pdf/315360IQ0Educa11Assessment01public1.pdf>.

²⁶ Milton, "THE NEGLECTED PILLAR OF RECOVERY: A STUDY OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN POST-WAR IRAQ AND LIBYA," 214–15.

²⁷ John Agresto, *Mugged By Reality: The Liberation of Iraq and the Failure of Good Intentions* (Encounter Books, 2007), 147.

humanitarian agencies and also take their expert opinions into account on a timely basis. Better aid distribution only improves the chances of allowing long-term institutions to set up by easing the harsh perceptions that inhabitants may have towards foreign powers in the short run. Certain pre-existing mechanisms for aid deployment, if available, should be fully exploited and possibly improved over time due to time constraints and the large administrative burden of starting from scratch.

Another key issue that is extremely relevant to the Middle Eastern case is to be extremely mindful of existing ethnic and religious identity politics in the region in focus. It is important to create a unified identity for the recovering nation and put in place institutions that reflect a shared identity that pervades ethno-sectarian divisions as much as possible. In the case of Iraq, the use of sectarian quotas and decentralization from the central authority gave rise to independent groups that represented partisan interests rather than ambitions for a unified state. A key part of this is prior research on the ethnic and religious composition of a country and its neighbours. Given the literature on crime increasing through cross-border mechanisms during internal conflict and the ethnic leanings towards certain favourable neighbours, securing the borders is essential to creating a vacuum within which stability can be nurtured and shaped with policy. Outside interests serve to dilute intended policy impacts (or reverse them unfavourably) whilst diluting a common identity that is characteristic of building the foundations of stability.

Competent and adequate human capital is a must for the reconstruction and revival of people-centric institutions, especially in developing regions. Implementing a fair justice system is a key part of this process, which enables several other institutions to grow in turn. This idea rests on the economic principle of secure property rights allowing economic growth, as people put in the effort to fully maximise their ownership of resources. However, to power this dynamic high high-quality labour and faith in the system are required. For this reason, any external force must be extremely careful when dealing with supporters of the displaced regime, aiming to avoid political persecution as much as possible. Especially in the context of previously autocratic systems, ground-level members often have no choice but to lend nominal support to the incumbent. The regime must attempt to villainise the ideas they are attempting to replace with their own, but not at the expense of angering the general populace. Early political persecution could further isolate disapproving citizens and also lead to labour constraints in key areas.

6. Conclusion

Therefore, the case study of American intervention in Iraq showcases the need for well-administered aid that is planned in advance and makes use of the expertise of relevant agencies in the humanitarian field. However, to satisfy the long-run concerns of resource management and state building in the literature, there is a strong need for prioritizing the security of resources, securing key labour for foundational institutions and creating a vacuum free from the impacts of

third parties. To optimally execute policies that work towards these goals, the advantaged power must have a comprehensive understanding of regional geopolitics and socioeconomic structures within the nation. It must be emphasised that these findings only stem from one case study and although it captures certain key aspects of conflict in the Middle East that remain common across many cases, a more extensive comparative study would be required to garner findings that more closely resemble the ideal policy in similar scenarios for the region.

7. References

- “21st Century Conflicts | Military History Books | Helion & Company.” Accessed November 7, 2024. <https://www.helion.co.uk/periods/21st-century.php>.
- Agresto, John. *Mugged By Reality: The Liberation of Iraq and the Failure of Good Intentions*. Encounter Books, 2007.
- Akram, Saira, and Muqarrab Akbar. “US Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Emerging Challenges and Future Prospects.” *Global Foreign Policies Review* VI, no. I (March 30, 2023): 97–111. [https://doi.org/10.31703/gfpr.2023\(VI-I\).09](https://doi.org/10.31703/gfpr.2023(VI-I).09).
- Ali, Panira. “FRENCH COLONIALISM TO NEO-COLONIALISM IN MALI: : AN ANALYTICAL STUDY.” *Journal of European Studies (JES)* 34, no. 2 (July 2, 2018): 112–29.
- “Briefing on Humanitarian Reconstruction Issues.” Accessed December 19, 2024. <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030224-11.html>.
- Brown, Kaysie. “War Economies and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Identifying a Weak Link.” Accessed November 7, 2024. <https://journals-sagepub-com.ie.idm.oclc.org/doi/epdf/10.1080/15423166.2006.260470878529>.
- Claes, Dag Harald. “The United States and Iraq: Making Sense of the Oil Factor.” *Middle East Policy* 12, no. 4 (2005): 48–57. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2005.00223.x>.
- Coipuram, Tom. “Iraq: United Nations and Humanitarian Aid Organizations,” March 1, 2003.
- Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoefler. “Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies.” *European Economic Review* 48, no. 5 (October 1, 2004): 1125–45. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2003.11.005>.
- Cushman, Thomas. *A Matter of Principle: Humanitarian Arguments for War in Iraq*. Univ of California Press, 2005.
- David, Antonio C, Fabiano Rodrigues Bastos, and Marshall Mills. “Post-Conflict Recovery: Institutions, Aid, or Luck?,” June 2011.
- Department Of State. The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs. “Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Achievements Through the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund.” Department Of State. The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs., February 8, 2006. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/60857.htm>.
- Ginty, Roger Mac. “The Pre-War Reconstruction of Post-War Iraq.” *Third World Quarterly* 24, no. 4 (August 2003): 601–17. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0143659032000105777>.
- Kareem, Ali Abbas, Safa Mahdi Raji, and Basim Abdullah Kadhim. “THE WEAKNESS OF THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE INTEGRITY COMMISSION IN REDUCING THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL CORRUPTION IN IRAQ AN ANALYTICAL STUDY FOR THE PERIOD OF 2005-2020 (RESEARCH SERIES)” 20, no. 6 (2021).
- Matsunaga, Hideki. *The Reconstruction of Iraq after 2003: Learning from Its Successes and Failures*. World Bank, Washington, DC, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-1390-0>.
- Milton, Sansom Aran. “THE NEGLECTED PILLAR OF RECOVERY: A STUDY OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN POST--WAR IRAQ AND LIBYA,” n.d.
- Ndikumana, Léonce. “The Role of Foreign Aid in Post-Conflict Countries.” In *Building Sustainable Peace*, edited by Arnim Langer and Graham K. Brown, 141–59. Oxford University Press, 2016.

<https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198757276.003.0009>.

“Rebuilding the Iraqi State: The Regional Dimension of Ethno-Sectarian Conflict (2003-2016) - ProQuest.” Accessed December 19, 2024.

<https://www.proquest.com/docview/2189020106/53785F8FAC8041F5PQ/3?accountid=27285&sourcetype=Dissertations%20&%20Theses>.

Reuters. “U.S. Can’t Account for \$8.7 Billion of Iraq’s Money: Audit.” July 27, 2010, sec. World.

<https://www.reuters.com/article/world/us-cant-account-for-87-billion-of-iraqs-money-audit-idUSTRE66Q556/>.

“UN/World Bank Iraq Joint Needs Assessment: Education Sector.” Accessed December 19, 2024.

<https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/898741468262742934/pdf/315360IQ0Educa11Assessment01public1.pdf>.